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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Bush Administration begins its second term, the
telecommunications sector continues to wait and wonder whether President
Bush will have anything more to say about telecom policy in the next four
years than he did during the last four. The President was largely MIA on
telecom and high-technology policy during his first term.1 In many ways,
this is hardly surprising. Telecom policy is very dry and technical; it does
not make for good stump speeches by politicians or for engaging in dinner
table talk for the average family.
But that does not mean that Telecom policy is not important and
* Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Media Freedom, Progress & Freedom Foundation,
Washington, D.C.
1. Adam Thierer, The Bush Administration's Broadband Policy Record,
TECHKNOWLEDGE No. 43 (Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 11, 2002, at
http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/021111-tk.html; Adam Thierer, Is the Bush Administration
Finally Getting Serious about Broadband Policy?, TECHKNOWLEDGE No. 81 (Cato Institute,
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 28, 2004, at http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/040428-tk.html.
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deserving of at least some consideration by our elected officials. A
significant portion of our modern Information Age economy is built on the
foundations of our communications and high-technology sectors. The rules
that govern these sectors, therefore, are of extraordinary importance
compared to the rules governing agriculture or steel, two of the main
economic engines of the past. Sadly, however, it is those sectors which
continue to capture the President's attention. It remains to be seen if the
President's policies will catch up with economic history.
Even if the Bush team is not interested in pursuing major
telecommunications reform,, Congress might be. The respective Commerce
committees have already started thinking about what the next version of the
Telecommunications Act should look like. Technological changes
unforeseen by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecom Act"), such
as the rapid development of wireless, the Internet and high-speed
broadband, and VoIP, have forced lawmakers to begin considering how
these new services fit into old regulatory paradigms. Many policymakers
still fail to grasp the fact that major portions of the Telecom Act have
already been rendered somewhat obsolete by the rapid evolution of
technology and competition in just the past ten years. If recent
developments are any guide, this process will only continue in coming
years, and at an accelerated pace.
Regulatory reform is no longer merely an option; it is essential if
lawmakers want to make sure that the laws governing this important sector
keep pace with the rapidly changing times. Luckily, with the tenth
anniversary of the Telecom Act rapidly approaching, there will be greater
focus on its flaws and failings. With increased attention there will likely be
many calls to reopen the issue and revise the Telecom Act.
What went wrong with the Telecom Act? This is not the place for a
full dissection of the Telecom Act to identify all its problems, but in
general, a simple paradox summarizes what was most wrong about the
measure: Congress wanted market competition but did not trust the free
market enough to tell regulators to step aside and allow markets to function
on their own.3 Consequently, the FCC, the Department of Justice, the
courts, and state and local regulatory commissions, have spent the last ten
2. Adam Thierer, Number Portability Decision Adds to Wireline Telecom Sector's
Perfect Storm, TECHKNOWLEDGE No. 66 (Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.). Nov. 20, 2003,
at http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/031120-tk.html; Adam Thierer, Twilight for Traditional
Telecom Regulation?, TECHKNOWLEDGE No. 91 (Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 25,
2004, at http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/041025-tk.htmi.
3. ADAM THIERER, CATO INSTITUTE, A 10-POINT AGENDA FOR COMPREHENSIVE
TELECOM REFORM, BRIEFING PAPER No. 63 (May 8, 2001), at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-063es.html.
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years treating this industry as a regulatory plaything with which to be
endlessly toyed. Today, there is virtually no element of telecommunications
that is not subject to some sort of meddling by some or all of these
regulators.
While it is fair to say that it was probably wishful thinking to believe
we could have undone a century's worth of command and control
regulatory policies in only a few short years, one would have hoped that we
would not still be stuck debating the same issues today that dominated the
agenda over a decade ago. Indeed, if Rip Van Winkle fell asleep in 1994
and woke up in 2004, he would not think he'd missed a beat if telecom
regulation was any guide.
Yet again, technology marches on even if the law doesn't. The law,
however, is increasingly in conflict with marketplace realities or worse yet,
is holding back further technological progress. As these revolutionary
technological changes compel the consideration of regulatory change, the
Bush Administration will have to make a simple choice: Do we lead or
follow? That is, will the President craft a clear policy for telecom and high-
technology, or will he let Congress be in the proverbial driver's seat.
Regardless of who is leading reform efforts, this Essay aims to
provide a simple framework for telecom liberalization. Indeed, much of the
problem with the Telecom Act could be traced to the fact that it was
anything but a simple framework. It was a convoluted, bloated,
ambiguously-worded mess of a legislative measure. As Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia famously noted of the Act, "[it] is not a model of
clarity. It is in many important respects a [model of ambiguity] or indeed
even [self-contradiction]. That is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation
that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the economy worth tens of
billions of dollars."4 This ambiguity explains why the Act was the subject
of almost endless litigation, including two trips to the Supreme Court. And
a third trip was only narrowly avoided when the Bush Administration and
FCC chose not to push for a review of a major decision by the D.C. Circuit
Appeals Court, which again overturned many FCC rules.
5
To avoid a similar outcome on the next legislative go-round, it would
be wise for policymakers to follow one very simple piece of advice: Keep it
simple! Simple principles and rules should guide their reform efforts. Do
not try to appease every interest with specific language; craft the new rules
such that they are generally applicable to all players. Most importantly, do
not live under the illusion that size matters. Indeed the opposite is probably
4. AT&T Corp., v. Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
5. U. S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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true: A ten-page bill would be infinitely better than a 100-page bill.
With simplicity in mind, the Author would like to suggest three
important over arching themes or priorities that should guide future
telecom policy reform efforts:
(1) Rafionalizing regulatory classifications;
(2) Sorting out jurisdictional matters;
(3) Getting agency power and size under control
II. REGULATORY CLASSIFICATIONS
With respect to regulatory classifications, a general consensus exists
today that Congress will need to formally close the book on the archaic
regulatory classifications of the past, which pigeonhole technologies and
providers into distinct vertical policy silos. That is, we still have Title II for
common carriers, Title III for wireless, Title IV for cable, and so on, even
though rapid technological change and convergence have largely wiped out
such distinctions and pitted these formerly distinct sectors against one
another in heated competition for consumer allegiance. Thus, although the
communications and broadband marketplace is becoming one giant fruit
salad of services and providers, regulators are still separating out the
apples, oranges, and bananas and regulating them differently. This must
end.
One way to do this is to replace the vertical silos model with a
horizontal layers model that more closely resembles the way the new
marketplace operates. We can divide the new industry into at least four
distinct layers: (1) content; (2) applications; (3) code; and, (4)
infrastructure. Then, if we must, we can regulate each accordingly. But
the Author would caution Congress against formally enshrining a network
layers model as a new regulatory regime. While this model provides a
useful analytical tool to help us rethink and eliminate the outmoded policy
paradigms of the past, we would not want these new layers to become the
equivalent of rigid regulatory quarantines or firewalls on industry
innovation or vertical integration.
A second and better way to tear down the old regulatory paradigms
6. Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED.
COMM. L.J. 587 (2004).
7. Adam D. Thierer, Are "Dumb Pipe" Mandates Smart Public Policy?: Vertical
Integration, "Net Neutrality, " and the Network Layers Model, Apr. 15, 2004, 3 J. OF
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming Mar., 2005); ADAM D. THIERER, CATO
INSTITUTE, NET NEUTRALITY: DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION OR REGULATORY GAMESMANSHIP IN
CYBERSPACE?, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 507 (Jan. 9, 2004), at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/pas/pa-507es.html.
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and achieve regulatory parity would be to borrow a page from trade law
and adopt the equivalent of a most favored nation principle for
communications. In a nutshell, this policy would state that the following:
"Any communications carrier seeking to offer a new service or entering a
new line of business, should be regulated no more stringently than its least
regulated competitor., 8 This would allow us to achieve regulatory
simplicity and parity not by "regulating up" to put everyone on equal,
difficult footing, but rather by "deregulating down." 9 Given the confusion
over the Brand X court case and the ongoing FCC investigation into a Title
1 information services classification for broadband, this most favored
nation approach might help us bring some resolution to this difficult issue.
III. JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS
Next we come to jurisdictional matters, which could very well end up
being the most controversial issue that Congress will take up if it chooses
to reopen the Telecom Act. Here the Author is referring to the heated
debate between federal, state, and local regulators for control over the
future of communications policy.'
0
Decentralization of political power almost always has a positive effect
in terms of expanding human liberty. But as our Founders wisely realized
when penning the Constitution, there are some important exceptions to that
general rule. Telecommunications regulation is one of those cases where
state and local experimentation does not work so well. After all, at the very
heart of telecommunications lies the notion of transcending boundaries and
making geography and distance irrelevant. If ever there was a good case to
be made for an activity being considered interstate commerce, this is it.
Yet, America's telecom market remains riddled with a patchwork of
policies that actually thwart that goal, seek to divide the indivisible, and
place boundaries on the boundless.
8. Adam D. Thierer, Telecom Newspeak: The Orwellian World of Broadband
"Deregulation ", in TELECRISIS: How REGULATION STIFLES HIGH-SPEED INTERNET ACCESS 9-
31 (Sonia Arrison ed., 2003), available at http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/techno/
telecrisis.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Adam D. Thierer, Federalist Society, Federalism and Telecommunications (2001),
at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/telecommunications/
federalism-telecomv3il.htm; Robert W. Hahn, Anne Layne-Farrar, & Peter Passell,
Federalism and Regulation, REGULATION, Winter 2003-2004, at 46, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n4/v26n4-7.pdf.
11. ADAM D. THIERER, THE DELICATE BALANCE: FEDERALISM, INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1998).
12. Adam Thierer, Will "States' Rights" Derail Telecom Deregulation?,
TECHKNOWLEDGE No. 49 (Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 14, 2003, at
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This must end. The only way it will end is by federal lawmakers
taking the same difficult step they had to take when deregulating airlines,
trucking, railroads, and banking: preemption. They must get serious about
the national policy framework mentioned in the preamble of the Telecom
Act by comprehensively preempting state and local regulation in this
sector. The rise of wireless and Internet-based forms of communications
makes this an absolute necessity.
If federal policy makers feel compelled to leave some authority to
state regulators, why not devolve to them any universal service
responsibilities that continue to be deemed necessary? This is one area
where experimentation can work if the states devise targeted assistance
mechanisms. But they should not be allowed to impose regulatory restraints
or levies on interstate communications to do so.
IV. AGENCY POWER
The final big picture reform involves what may have been the most
glaring omission from the Telecom Act: the almost complete failure to
contain or cut back the size and power of the FCC. Again, we would do
well to remember the lessons of the past. When Congress deregulated
airlines, trucking, and railroads, lawmakers wisely realized that
comprehensive and lasting reform was possible only if the agencies that
oversaw those sectors were also reformed or even eliminated.
In the telecom world, by contrast, the FCC grew bigger and more
powerful in the wake of deregulation. Greg Sidak of the American
Enterprise Institute has found that, compared to the years prior to passage
of the Telecom Act, FCC spending went up by 37 percent, the number of
pages in the FCC Record tripled, and there was a 73 percent increase in the
number of telecom lawyers. 13 It is safe to say that there can be no
deregulation cannot occur in an industry by granting regulators more power
over that industry.
This too must end. The next attempt at revising the Telecom Act must
do more than just hand the FCC vague forbearance language while
suggesting that the agency take steps to voluntarily regulate less. We
cannot expect the regulators to deregulate themselves. 14 Lawmakers need
to impose clear sunsets on existing FCC powers, especially the
http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/030314-tk.html.
13. J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207
(2003), available at http://www.yale.eduIlaw/1eo/papers/sidak.pdf.
14. ALFRED E. KAHN, WHOM THE GODS WOULD DESTROY OR How NOT TO
DEREGULATE, (2001), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/
page.php?id= 112.
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infrastructure-sharing provisions of the current Telecom Act. 15 Then they
need to impose sunsets on any new transitional powers granted them in the
next Telecom Act. FCC funding cuts are also needed.
If lawmakers fail to take steps to limit and then eliminate agency
powers, they run the risk of allowing regulators to gradually incorporate
new competitors and technologies-such as the Internet and broadband-
into the old regulatory system. The very fact that these new competitors
and technologies exist makes the need for the old regulations more dubious
than ever before.
V. CONCLUSION: ENDING THE "CHICKEN LITTLE COMPLEX"
In conclusion, it is the Author's hope that regardless of who leads the
reform charge in coming years-the Bush Administration or congressional
lawmakers-that they will reject the many doomsdayers and naysayers in
the telecom sector who claim the sky will fall without incessant regulatory
oversight and intervention. The "Chicken Little complex" seems to run
rampant throughout this sector even though it is less warranted than ever
before.
Policymakers have a chance to make more than just a clean break
with the past; they have the chance now to close the book on a regulatory
past that has done little to truly benefit consumers. Regulators have been
given over 100 years to conduct a grand experiment with the telecom
sector. Why not give markets a chance for once?
15. ADAM D. THIERER & CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., WHAT'S YOURS IS MINE: OPEN
ACCESS AND THE RISE OF INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIALISM (2003).
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